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Abstract. Embedded network devices have become an ubiquitous fix-
ture in the modern home, office as well as in the global communication
infrastructure. Devices like routers, NAS appliances, home entertainment
appliances, wifi access points, web cams, VoIP appliances, print servers
and video conferencing units reside on the same networks as our personal
computers and enterprise servers and together form our world-wide com-
munication infrastructure. Widely deployed and often misconfigured,
they constitute highly attractive targets for exploitation. In this study
we present the results of a vulnerability assessment of embedded network
devices within the world’s largest ISPs and civilian networks, spanning
North America, Europe and Asia. The observed data confirms the intu-
ition that these devices are indeed vulnerable to trivial attacks and that
such devices can be found throughout the world in large numbers.
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1 Introduction
Embedded network devices perform specific functions like routing, file storage
etc. Competition among manufacturers demand that these products be produced
with minimal time to market at the lowest cost possible. These common com-
modity products are often implemented without security in mind and reside on
the same networks as general purpose computers, making them attractive tar-
gets for exploitation. Once compromised, communication devices like routers,
voip appliances, and video conferencing units can be used to quietly intercept
and alter the traffic they carry. Nearly all embedded network devices contain a
network interface which can be used to perform layer-2 and layer-3 attacks on
the rest of the network. Since host based protection schemes for embedded de-
vices generally do not exist today and network based protection schemes (802.1X
etc) often intentionally exclude such devices administratively, exploitation and
root-kitting1 of these devices proves to be very advantageous to the attacker.
1 The companion paper to this field survey will detail Doppelga¨nger; a semi-virtualized
exploitation method for root-kitting heterogeneous embedded devices in a device and
operating system agnostic manner.
2 Cui, Song, Prabhu and Stolfo
2 Methodology
This paper presents preliminary results from our larger communications inse-
curity study by scanning, on a global scale, for perhaps the simplest attack
possible; publicly accessible administrative interface with default password. We
targeted the largest ISP networks in North America, Europe, and Asia, scanning
and cataloging popular network appliances accessible over the internet. Out of
all discovered devices, we then tabulated the number of such devices which are
configured with their factory default administrative passwords. This data is then
broken down by device types (Linksys, Polycom, Cisco etc), device class (Con-
sumer, Enterprise, VOIP etc) and by geographical region (Zipcodes within the
US and by Country world-wide).
Total IPs Scanned Webservers Telnet Servers Devices Targeted Vul. Devices Found
85.7 Million 1.1 Million 800 Thousand 105,357 3,847
Table 1. Key scan statistics thus far.
Enterprise Devices VOIP Devices Consumer Devices
2.46% 19.21% 41.62%
Table 2. Vulnerability rate by device class.
3 Findings
Fig. 1. Linksys vul. distribution.
JPN CAN IND KOR
75.0% 60.0% 57.1% 57.1%
HUN AUT NLD USA
54.5% 50.0% 48.6% 38.5%
CZE FRA URY CHN
38.5% 34.2% 18.9% 10.0%
Fig. 2. Linksys vul. by country.
It is possible to draw several high level conclusions from the observed data.
Insecurity is pervasive world-wide: Vulnerable devices can be found in sig-
nificant numbers in all parts of the world covered by our scan. The double
digit vulnerability rates suggest that a large botnet can be created by consti-
tuting only embedded network devices. [1]. Geographical variations exist:
We found significant geographical concentrations of vulnerable devices of sev-
eral types. This is undoubtedly related to the targeted markets of these devices.
Consumer devices are most vulnerable: Looking at the vulnerability rates
between consumer and enterprise devices world-wide, we see a significant differ-
ence between 45.62% versus 2.46%.
Detailed findings of our vulnerability assessment will be published in it’s
entirety upon the completion of the global scan.
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